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We explore whether NHS hospitals managed their earnings upward before applying for Foundation 
Trust (FT) status, a scheme that allowed them greater financial freedom and management autonomy, in 
order to present an overly positive picture and increase their chances for a successful application. We 
show that NHS FTs adjusted discretionary accruals upward for up to two years before applying for FT 
status. This practice was negatively associated with their future financial performance.  
Impact  
Our analysis shows that prospective English NHS Foundation Trusts, in anticipation of institutional 
reforms granting them significant freedoms, engaged in income-increasing earnings management more 
intensely than did NHS Trusts that never attained this status. We also provide evidence that earnings 
management is associated, at least partly, with the future underperformance of NHS FTs, confirming 
an untested hypothesis in the literature. Hence, incentives that the state provides to public 
organisations can have a significant effect on their behaviour—much like in the private sector. Our 
paper calls for improved incentive designs by regulatory bodies to prevent unintended consequences. 
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This paper tests for the existence of earnings management (hereafter, EM) among public 
healthcare organisations in the context of incentives arising around periods of significant 
institutional change. At the beginning of the new millennium, the English National Health 
Service (NHS) underwent a series of policy reforms that aimed to enhance patient choice, 
increase competition in the healthcare sector and decentralise decision-making (Department of 
Health 2002). Central to these reforms was the concept of ‘earned autonomy’, the idea that 
more autonomy should be given to senior managers within well-performing NHS hospitals, in 
order to reduce bureaucracy and improve efficiency (Davies et al., 2001). The realisation of this 
idea took place in 2004, when the first wave of NHS hospitals were granted Foundation Trust 
(hereafter, FT) status; a new organisational scheme which allowed them a greater degree of 
financial freedom, less centralised control and more local governance (Health and Social Care 
Act, 2003).  
Conversion to FT status implies a number of operating and financing benefits for the hospital 
and its senior management team (Greener, 2004; Morrell, 2006). Unlike NHS Trusts, FTs do 
not have a statutory obligation to breakeven; they can retain surpluses, are free to employ new 
staff, invest in capital and borrow from the public or the private sector (Health and Social Care 
Act, 2003). More importantly, financial decisions by FTs  made at the hospital level and are 
detached from the Department of Health’s immediate control. The senior management team is 
accountable to the Trust’s Board and a significant layer of public sector bureaucracy is 
removed. Hospitals are granted FT status on the basis of three main pillars: clinical excellence, 
financial robustness and strong leadership (Monitor, 2005; Monitor, 2013). FTs were 
considered the ‘flagship’ of NHS hospitals (BBC, 2005); hence, conversion to FT status was 
seen by the senior management team of hospitals, and in particular, by Chief Executive Officers 
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(CEOs) and Finance Directors (FDs), as the attainment of very prestigious brand name that 
confirmed the leadership skills of the top team of the organisation.  
Despite a number of concerns regarding the new initiative, including issues of governance 
(Allen et al., 2012; Klein, 2004), the general perception has been that hospitals that became FTs 
were financially very robust (Audit Commission, 2008; Greener, 2004; Oliver, 2005). This was 
enhanced by the strict financial criteria that hospitals had to fulfil before applying for FT status. 
However, a bit more than a decade later, 118 out of 151 NHS FTs report losses (or so-called 
‘deficits’), and future projections do not look optimistic (Monitor, 2015). The reasons for the 
described financial situation of FTs are not one-dimensional, but the huge losses raise questions 
about the financial robustness of English hospitals prior to becoming FTs.  
Previous literature has shown that English NHS hospitals had incentives to present a better 
financial situation even prior to the establishment of FTs, to achieve their statutory requirement 
to breakeven. Ballantine et al. (2007), exploring the period between 1998-2004, show that NHS 
Trusts made use of discretionary accruals (hereafter, DA) in order to meet their statutory duty 
to breakeven, while the distribution of their reported income showed discontinuities around 
zero, to avoid penalties for failure. Yet, the use of DA for achieving earnings targets may 
mechanically reverse in the future, resulting in unexpected and sudden deterioration of reported 
performance (Ballantine et al., 2007). This (empirically untested) expectation by Ballantine et 
al. (2007) implies that eventual EM practices undertaken by NHS hospitals may be negatively 
associated with future financial performance.  
Our paper’s aim is twofold. First, we explore whether NHS hospitals in England managed 
earnings upward prior to applying for FT status, thus presenting an overly positive picture of 
their financial position. In other words, we test whether the benefits of FT status provided 
stronger incentives for EM than the NHS Trusts’ statutory obligation to breakeven did. Second, 
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given the expectation that EM should mechanically reverse over the course of time (Ballantine 
et al., 2007), we explore whether managing earnings upward prior to becoming FTs is 
associated, even partly, with the hospitals’ future underperformance.       
2. Methodology  
       2.1 Measuring Discretionary Accruals 
To test for EM among English hospitals, we estimate and examine the properties and statistical 
significance of DA, following Ballantine et al. (2007, 2008) for the UK, and a similar 
methodology by Leone and Van Horn (2005) for the US. DA are defined as the Trust-specific 
residuals from the following equation, estimated yearly among NHS Trusts, based on Dechow 
and Dichev (2002), by incorporating the McNichols (2002) modification: 
   𝛥𝑊𝐶𝑖,𝑡/𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1/𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡/𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡+1/𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛼4𝛥𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡/𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼5𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡/𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                (1)                                        
ΔWC is change in working capital accruals between years t and t-1 (Δ(Current assets - CA) – 
Δ(Current liabilities –CL)), scaled by lagged Total assets (TA). Change in current assets is 
calculated by making use of all relevant assets (not just non-cash current assets). As Ballantine 
et al. (2007) discuss, this way of calculating change in working capital accruals includes cash 
balances (and also depreciation, consistent with Jones (1991), but unlike Dechow and Dichev 
(2002)), in an effort to reflect the scope for cash transfers within local health economies, which 
may be recognised as revenue. In accordance with past research (Ballantine et al., 2007 p. 425, 
2008 p. 29), we add an additional NHS-specific feature by including long-term debtors in 
current assets, which is standard practice in NHS Trust financial statements. Finally, CFO 
represents cash flows from operations for the year, and PPE is a Trust’s net value of Property, 
Plant and Equipment for the year, while all variables are scaled by lagged TA, as in Ballantine 
et al. (2007, 2008). 
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The first fiscal year for which FTs reported financial results was the year ending on March 31 
2005.We assume that NHS Trusts submitted their applications for FT status in the year prior to 
the one in which this status was awarded, as indicated by Monitor (Monitor, 2015). Hence, 
when testing for the existence of EM for the one and two years before the application was 
submitted, we perform this test for the two and three years before FT status was attained. In this 
way, when we examine the performance of FTs three years before gaining FT status, the starting 
year for the sample period is 2002; when assessing the performance of FTs two years before 
the first Trusts became FTs, the starting year of the sample period is 2003. Finally, we use a 
comparison sample to FTs (NonFTs), consisting of Trusts that never became FTs during the 
sample period.  
           2.2 Sample Selection 
Data were taken from the Laing and Buisson database of NHS Trust and FT financial 
statements, covering the period 1998-2014. To ensure sample correctness and consistency, we 
performed a manual check and matching process of Trusts and FTs across the years for which 
data were available. This process resulted in the safe identification of a total of 621 different 
Trusts and FTs together, out of which 147 were included in Laing and Buisson’s 2014 FT data 
files, while 157 were included in FT files at some point in their history after 2005. Out of these 
157 FTs, through a hand-tracking process, which was performed independently by the authors, 
17 Trusts were removed, as they did not have data for the whole period we analysed. This 
resulted in a final list of 140 FTs that we could follow with certainty for the whole period. 
Following this initial manual sample identification process, all subsequent calculations are data-
dependent.  
The profitability performance measures used by this study are operating profit or operating 
income (surplus/deficit - before any financing - OI) and residual (or retained) profit or income 
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(surplus/deficit - RI). Operating income is derived after subtracting operating expenses from 
operating revenue, while retained income represents the equivalent of bottom-line earnings for 
for-profit entities, with one additional feature unique to the NHS: retained income is derived 
after the subtraction of the so-called Public Dividend Capital (PDC) dividend charge for the 
year, representing a return of 3.5% of a Trust’s net assets, and reflecting the cost of capital 
utilised by the Trust (NHS manual for accounts, indicatively for 2013-2014 (My NHS body, 
2014)). Hence, retained income in the NHS is often mentioned as ‘residual income’ in relevant 
research (Ballantine et al., 2007), indicative of this cost of capital charge, before the final profit 
figure is derived. The residual income figure obtained by Laing and Buisson involves its 
calculation after subtracting net asset impairment from the income statement, and not taking 
into account any prior-period adjustments or items leading to the calculation of total 
comprehensive income. 
During our sample period, a significant change was the introduction of the International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Financial statements were prepared under UK GAAP 
(adapted for NHS Trusts) before 2010 and, since then, have been prepared under IFRS. For 
2009, Laing and Buisson provides IFRS restated data for FTs but not for NHS Trusts. Therefore, 
we use financial statement information for 2009 prepared under UK GAAP for both sets of 
Trusts. This combined use of UK GAAP and IFRS data inevitably affects the calculation of 
DA, for which we use intertemporal values for CFO around the IFRS transition year. Ellwood 
and Garcia-Lacalle (2012) compare UK GAAP and restated financial statements under IFRS 
and identify the main sources of differences between UK GAAP- and IFRS-prepared financial 
statements for the NHS. Given the inevitable simultaneous existence of IFRS- and UK GAAP-
calculated financial results in our sample, we expect that the fact that they were applied in the 
same year for both Trusts and FT should alleviate any comparative biases. We further calculate 
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our EM measure (DA) on a year-by-year basis, to avoid combining values estimated under 
different reporting regimes over different periods.  
2.3 Propensity Score Matching  
As a further attempt to test for EM, we performed propensity score matching between FTs 
before achieving FT status and NonFTs. We employed a one-to-one nearest neighbour 
matching with a replacement matching procedure, restricting attention to propensity scores that 
support both groups of firms (Michaely and Roberts, 2012). We first estimate a probit model 
regression in which the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the NHS Trust in question 
achieved FT status in the following two (or three) years, and zero for Trusts that never achieved 
foundation status (NonFTs - control sample). We include firm size (LnTA), and human resource 
cost intensity (Staff costs/TAt-1) as independent variables in this probit model regression, in an 
effort to control for operating characteristics that are not, however, performance-related. At the 
same time, Monitor has reported that the cost of the workforce should be one of the main drivers 
of the financial deterioration of FTs (Monitor, 2015). Using the predicted probabilities 
(propensity scores) from the probit regression, matches are then forced between FTs and 
NonFTs within the same year, permitting to explicitly control for year factors. Thus, using the 
predicted propensity scores, each FT-year observation is matched to the corresponding NonFT-
year observation, which minimises the absolute value of the difference between the propensity 
scores (Michaely and Roberts, 2012). 
3. Empirical Findings 
3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 confirms the rapid deterioration of FTs immediately after they changed status. 
Extremely few FTs reported deficits before attaining FT status (0.76 and 2.17% for OI and 7.32 
and 6.92% for RI, for three and two years prior to FT status year, respectively). However, 
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relevant deficit percentages steadily exceed 10% for OI, and are actually around or over 25% 
for RI, one to three years after the Trust in question achieved FT status (12.32, 13.87, and 16.28 
for OI, and 26.81, 23.82, and 24.81 for RI, one, two and three years post-conversion). At the 
same time, percentages for Trusts that never became FT during 2002-2014 are around 20% for 
OI and 37.64% for RI during this time. Hence, despite evidence for strong financial 
performance in the years before their status changed, FTs showed significantly deteriorating 
performance in the years immediately following their transition.  
Insert Table 1 about here. 
Table 2 reports percentile breakpoints for OI and RI levels (scaled by lagged Total assets) before 
and after achieving FT status during 2002-2014. It also reports information about mean values 
for OI and RI surplus/deficit levels for the same period. It shows that although mean and median 
values remain roughly the same, the distribution of these values for the lowest and highest 
percentile values is strongly differentiated for the years before, as opposed to after conversion. 
In the case of OI, only values for the lowest 1% are negative in the three and two years before 
conversion, while negative values are observed for up to the lowest 10% breakpoint post-
conversion, and a similar behaviour is observed for RI level values. At the same time, values 
for both OI and RI appear to be more strongly negative for the lowest distribution percentiles 
in the post-conversion period. The opposite behaviour is seen for breakpoint values at the other 
end of the distribution, when comparing the pre vs. post conversion periods. Although the best 
performing Trusts pre-conversion did not appear to realise surpluses higher than 10%, we 
observe that in the post-conversion period, relevant values for OI and RI levels may easily 
exceed 10%, and reach up to 0.1778 for OI and 0.1620 for RI for percentile 99% three years 
after conversion, with a similar behaviour for the immediately lower percentile breakpoints as 
well. Hence, the dispersion of operating performance is greater to an impressive extent in the 
post vs. pre conversion period. Although a casual comparison of average performance metrics 
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before vs. after FT status attainment does not exhibit strong changes, there appears to exist more 
strongly negative and much more strongly positive performance for converted FTs in the post-
conversion period, compared to a more smooth operating performance behaviour before. In 
other words, the number of poor, as well as very good performers increased in the years after 
conversion, resulting in the findings already observed from Table 1 on strongly higher 
percentages of FTs reporting deficits after conversion, compared to the pre-conversion period. 
Insert Table 2 about here. 
Table 3  reports descriptive statistics for FTs (two years before achieving FT status) in Panel 
A, and for Trusts that never attained FT status (NonFTs) in Panel B during 2003-2014.In Panel 
A, there are further reported results on statistical significance for a two-sample two-tailed t-test 
on the equality of means (by assuming that variances between the two samples are unequal), 
and a two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test for medians between FTs and Trusts 
that never became FTs.  
Insert Table 3 about here. 
FTs are observed to be, on average, significantly smaller than NonFTs, in terms of amounts of 
Cash, CA, Depreciation, Intangible assets, PP&E, Total income, Income from core activities, 
Total expenditures, and Total assets. Cash flows from operations (CFO) are significantly 
smaller for FTs when using medians, but not means, and there are no significant differences in 
Total net assets between the two groups. However, OI (Operating income-surplus/deficit), and 
RI (Residual income -surplus/deficit) amounts are significantly higher for FTs than for NonFTs 
in terms of amounts, despite the smaller size of the former group.  
Following Table 3, FTs experience significantly higher operating and retained surpluses, 
whether or not scaling by lagged TA or Staff costs is used. Furthermore, FTs appear to be 
significantly less levered and more fixed, rather than intangible asset-intensive than NonFTs. 
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FTs have significantly lower staff costs as a percentage of their total assets than NonFTs (Staff 
costs/TAt-1, of 0.9174 vs. 1.1059, for mean values), with higher CFO generation ability 
(CFO/TAt-1 of 0.0828 vs. 0.0715 for means). Finally, we observe that FTs tend to experience 
larger median increases in their income (total and core) and expenditures.  
3.2 Comparative Analysis Between FTs and NonFTs 
The histograms in Figure 1, present the distribution of reported RI scaled by lagged TA (Panel 
A) and Nondiscretionary Income (Panel B) for NHS FTs two years before achieving FT status 
during 2003-2014. The interval width in the histograms is 0.005, following Leone and Van 
Horn (2005), while frequency denotes the number of observations in a given interval. 
Nondiscretionary income (NondiscrInc) refers to residual income unaffected by DA (residual 
income minus discretionary accruals, Leone and Van Horn, 2005; using lagged TA scaling), 
computed in accordance with past research (Ballantine et al., 2007; Leone and Van Horn, 2005). 
Insert Figure 1 here. 
What we observe from Figure 1 for Trusts that eventually became FTs is that the distribution 
of their retained (or residual) income is centred on marginally positive values. A casual 
comparison of Panels A and B shows that the distribution for NondiscrInc, however, is more 
dispersed and not as concentrated into the zero-profit threshold. Past research has indeed shown 
that NHS Trusts engaged in EM in an effort to achieve the zero earnings benchmark (Ballantine 
et al., 2007), while histograms from Figure 1 confirm this behaviour for bottom-line income of 
Trusts before becoming FTs. Nevertheless, when estimating their profitability by excluding the 
discretionary component of accruals, profit does not exhibit the same small positive profit 
trends, but is rather more balanced.   
Next, we directly examine whether FTs engaged in income-increasing EM, in comparison to 
Trusts that never achieved FT status. Table 4 Panel A shows that correlation coefficients 
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between DA and NondiscrInc are between -0.8 and -0.97 for FTs (two or three years before FT 
status conversion, respectively) and around -0.5 for the comparison sample. At the same time, 
performing a correlation coefficient comparison, the Fisher r-to-z transformation - Z test, 
indicates that these differences in the coefficients are strongly statistically significant at the 1% 
level. A strongly negative correlation between DA and NondiscrInc is consistent with reported 
income close to zero and nondiscretionary income equal or opposite to the value of 
discretionary accruals, which would be the expected behaviour of accruals if a Trust aimed to 
achieve a financial breakeven target (Ballantine et al., 2007). Hence, these findings indicate that 
this tendency is significantly stronger for FTs than for Trusts that never attained FT status. 
Insert Table 4 here. 
We then observe from Panel B of Table 4 that after performing one-sample tests, mean and 
median DA in the years before achieving FT status, are strongly statistically significant in every 
case. This result indicates a significant tendency among prospective FTs to engage in upward 
EM in the years before achieving FT status. More importantly, Panel C of Table 4 reports results 
on the significance of differences in mean (two-tailed (Pr(|T|>|t|) and one-tailed (Pr(T < t), 
testing for whether DA for FTs are significantly larger than DA for NonFTs) and median DA 
between prospective FTs and NonFTs. The comparison indicates that mean DA for prospective 
FTs for years before achieving FT status are significantly higher, compared to those observed 
for Trusts that never achieved FT status. The results for means are confirmed with the use of 
medians, for three (but not two) years before achieving FT status. Hence, results from Table 4 
overall, indicate that NHS Trusts that eventually became FTs engaged in significantly stronger 
income-increasing EM than Trusts that did not attain FT status.  
Table 5 reports results when applying PSM as described in Section 2.3, and first shows that the 
probability of becoming an FT significantly decreases with Trust size, and also staff cost 
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intensity; in other words, NHS Trusts that eventually became FTs tended to be smaller Trusts, 
and/or Trusts with lower staff costs as a percentage of their assets. More importantly, we 
observe that DA for Trusts that eventually became FTs are significantly higher than for Trusts 
that never became FTs. This result is significant for the minus-two (at the 10% level) and even 
more strongly for the minus-three-year period with reference to the year of the status transition. 
Table 5 reinforces relevant findings from Table 4, jointly indicating that prospective FTs 
engaged in income-increasing EM to a greater extent than did Trusts that never achieved FT 
status.  
Insert Table 5 here 
Finally, we estimate a so-called zero profit regression,  introduced by Leone and Van Horn 
(2005). In their study, they regress DA on Nondiscretionary Income, controlling for lagged 
profitability and lagged DA. The prediction of this estimation favours an inverse 
contemporaneous relation between DA and NondiscrInc, in cases in which healthcare 
organisations struggle to move profitability to zero. Past research shows that NHS Trusts had a 
tendency to work towards achieving the zero earnings benchmark in order to achieve financial 
breakeven in a context unrelated to FT applications (Ballantine et al., 2007), while the 
prediction made by this study is that  prospective FTs engaged in upwards EM more 
aggressively than NonFTs.  In this respect, the estimation of a zero-earnings benchmark 
regression is expected to provide insights about which Trusts—FTs or NonFTs—were more 
aggressive in pursuing profitability.  
Based on Leone and Van Horn (2005), we estimate the following equation using OLS and 
heteroscedasticity robust standard errors for NHS FTs two and three years before achieving FT 
status and Trusts that never achieved FT status (NonFTs - comparison sample): 
𝐷𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2 𝑅𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝐷𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                       (2) 
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The dependent variable DA refers to estimated discretionary accruals. Independent variables 
include NondiscrInc, lagged Residual Income (RIt-1 – scaled by lagged TA) and lagged DA. If 
Trusts managed earnings towards the zero earnings benchmark, α1 is expected to be negative 
and significant, while the predicted sign for α2 is positive, and no prediction is made for α3  
(Leone and Van Horn, 2005). Table 6 reports the estimation results for Equation (2). There are 
further reported Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) for the variable of interest NondiscrInc.  
Insert Table 6 here. 
Table 6 shows that, when estimating Equation (2) for either the FT or NonFT sample, the signs 
and significance for all regressors generally conform to expectations and are consistent with 
Leone and Van Horn (2005). This refers to the negative and significant sign for NondiscrInc 
and the positive sign for lagged RI. However, the coefficient magnitude and the value of the 
relevant t-statistic for NondiscrInc, either two or three years before achieving FT status, are 
higher for the FT compared to the NonFT sample, while VIFs get low values for this specific 
variable. More importantly, judging from the values and significance of the coefficient 
comparison test statistic X2, coefficients for NondiscrInc significantly differ between the two 
groups, at either the 5% (for minus two years) or the 1% (for minus three years) level. We 
interpret this result as indicating that prospective FTs were more eager to attain the zero 
earnings benchmark, compared to Trusts that did not become FTs, complementing findings 
from previous tables on comparatively higher upward EM for FTs vs NonFTs.  
3.3 The Association between EM and Future Operating Performance 
EM through the use of DA should eventually mechanically reverse, resulting in a sudden and 
unanticipated future drop in performance (Ballantine et al., 2007). Indeed, our descriptive 
evidence indicates a contrasting picture between the financial performance of FTs prior to 
acquiring their status, and immediately after they did. Therefore, we empirically test whether 
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EM undertaken two years before becoming FTs is associated with the probability of reporting 
a surplus rather than a deficit; and the level of any eventual surplus or deficit. In this way, we 
estimate the following equation for NHS Trusts that subsequently achieved FT status during 
2003-2014: 
    {𝑃𝑟[𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟. 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖,𝑡+3 = 1], 𝑃𝑟[𝑅𝑒𝑡. 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖,𝑡+3 = 1], 𝑂𝐼𝑖,𝑡+3,, 𝑅𝐼𝑖,𝑡+3 } = 𝛼0 +
𝛼1𝐷𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑂𝐼𝑖,𝑡+2 + 𝛼3𝐿𝑛𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼4𝛥(𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼5𝛥(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛼6𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼7𝛥𝑊𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼8𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑓𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼9𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡   (3) 
Estimation results for Equation (3) are reported in Table 7. The dependent variable is either a 
binary variable equal to one if RI or OI is positive one year after the Trust achieved foundation 
status, and zero otherwise (Panel A); or the level of RI or OI (scaled by lagged TA) one year 
after the Trust in question achieved FT status (Panel B). When the dependent variable is in 
binary (continuous) form, the Equation is estimated as a probit model (using OLS). Independent 
variables include DA; operating income as of the year the FT achieved foundation status (scaled 
by lagged TA - OIt+2); Trust size in terms of Total assets (LnTA); change in core income and 
total expenditures (scaled by lagged TA - Δ(Core income) and Δ(Total expenditure) 
respectively); financial leverage (expressed in the form of Net assets/TA); change in working 
capital (scaled by lagged TA - ΔWC); staff costs; and intangible asset intensity (scaled by lagged 
TA - Staff costs and Intangible assets, respectively). With the exception of OIt+2, all other 
independent variables are taken as of two years before the Trust achieved FT status. There are 
further reported VIFs for DA, as the variable of interest. 
We use controls for Trust size, past profitability (taken immediately before the year in which 
performance is assessed), and changes in income and expenditures, which could be at the root 
of eventual surpluses or deficits. We also control for financial leverage, staff costs and 
intangibles’ intensity. High levels of debt could indicate strong investment opportunities or poor 
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operating performance, while human resource and intangibles’ intensity should be expected to 
capture eventual value creation from investing in such resources. Finally, we use the change in 
working capital as a regressor, to control for an eventual mechanical effect of such changes into 
the measurement of accruals.  
Insert Table 7 were. 
Table 7, Panel A shows that DA are negatively and significantly associated with the probability 
of reporting an operating surplus one year post-FT status, and this holds for both RI surplus (at 
the 5% significance level) and OI surplus (at the 10% significance level). Panel B of the Table 
further indicates that DA are negatively and significantly (at the 10% level) associated with the 
magnitude of RI surplus, but are not statistically significant when expressing surplus in terms 
of OI. In other words, lower levels of EM two years before achieving FT status are associated 
with a higher probability of reporting a surplus one year post-FT status, and also with the 
magnitude of such a surplus, and vice versa. The results indicate that eventual EM undertaken 
by prospective FTs before achieving FT status shows reversal signs in terms of a negative effect 
on future operating performance. This significantly explains, at least in part, future operating 
performance post-FT status or eventual deficits vs. surpluses reported by FTs after receiving 
foundation status. 
With respect to the behaviour of the rest of regressors, we observe that the probability of 
reporting a surplus, and the magnitude of the surplus are positively associated with previous 
financial performance, positive changes to revenues, decreased expenses, and increases in 
working capital. However, these results are not statistically significant, while we get a weak 
indication of a negative association between Trust size and the probability of generating an 
operating profit surplus.  
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One could counter argue here that the poor financial performance of FTs post-conversion may 
not be driven by EM reversal, but rather by the general conditions affecting the industry as a 
whole. At this point, it should be clarified that we do not make any claim in this study that 
prospective FTs should be overall better or worse performers compared to NonFTs. Regarding 
the general economic conditions in the sector, it is a fact that state funding in the English NHS 
has varied significantly during our period of examination. However, in results reported in Table 
7, we explicitly included a control variable for the change in core Trust income, which is the 
main source of funding of both NonFTs and FTs, stemming from the government. In this way, 
although we acknowledge that the general condition of the industry could definitely play a role 
in the underperformance of converted FTs for some years of our sample period, this does not 
contradict the observation that potential EM pre-conversion has played a role as well. Findings 
from Table 2 also point toward this direction; they show that the percentage of FT 
underperformers, and relevant amounts of deficits, significantly and suddenly deteriorated in 
the years immediately after FT status conversion, which is consistent with a sudden reversal of 
EM practices by prospective FTs having marginally attained the surplus target in the years 
preceding conversion. 
A number of robustness checks were performed to check the validity of results reported in 
Tables 4-7. These controls indicate that our results from Equations (2) and (3) are robust to 
using an alternative measure for DA, estimated when defining working capital accruals through 
the use of non-cash assets only (Ballantine et al., 2007), and also when estimating our baseline 
results separately for FTs with Private Finance Initiatives (PFIs), for two and three years before 
achieving FT status. The PFI control refers mainly to the pre-IFRS adoption years, as one of 
the main changes to the NHS introduced by IFRS adoption had to do with stopping the treatment 
of PFIs as operating leases (Ellwood and Garcia-Lacalle, 2012). Finally, results remain 
qualitatively similar upon not adjusting current assets for long-term debtors, consistent with 
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small differences in current assets values with and without including long-term debtors within 
them observed in Table 3. For brevity, tables reporting these results not reported, but are 
available from the authors upon request. 
4. Conclusion 
Our paper finds strong evidence that the benefits of FT status significantly led hospitals to 
engage in upward DA manipulation prior to applying for the status, in order to present an 
improved financial picture. Our findings are also consistent with the hypothesis that this 
practice was negatively associated with the future financial performance of FTs.  
Evidence suggests that performance assessment may be done according to appropriate 
standards, yet it may miss the substantive goals behind the set targets (Bevan and Hood, 2006), 
with this goal to be that NHS Trusts converting to FT status showed solid evidence of financial 
robustness. We interpret our evidence on EM prior to applying for FT status as an indication of 
“reactive gaming” behaviour (Bevan and Hood, 2006), with reference to achieving a specific 
objective around an event.  
Our work contributes to the scarce but increasing literature on EM in the public sector 
supporting the argument that financial incentives in these settings need to be carefully thought 
to avoid manipulation of financial accounts (Vinnari and Nasi, 2008). Pina et al. (2012) find 
evidence of EM in government agencies in the UK, questioning the effectiveness of financial 
targets associated with accrual-based measures. Similarly, Stalebrink (2007) obtain evidence of 
EM in Swedish municipalities, while Ferreira et al. (2013), in their study on EM in local 
municipalities in Portugal, identified higher EM in those municipalities where political 
competition was greatest. We build on this research though evidence that financial incentives 
in the public sector, unless carefully thought, may lead to manipulation of the accounts in ways 
that are not anticipated. 
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At this point, we acknowledge that the sole focus of our study on EM through the use of DA 
without any testing for real EM, represents an inherent limitation of our study, attributed to data 
unavailability in order to construct relevant cost proxies needed for real EM examination. 
Another limitation of our analysis is that data availability does not allow us to disentangle 
potential mechanisms that underline our findings. For instance, we find that the size of a Trust 
is a factor crucial for the success of an application for FT, but we do not offer a more detailed 
explanation as to why this is the case. The size of the Trust may reflect differences in the mix 
and range of medical services (e.g. diagnosis-related group - DRGs) or mix of patient profiles 
(e.g. demographic characteristics). Given the lack of such data, our analysis cannot disentangle 
such potential effects.  
Our findings also have significant policy implications. Our evidence indicates that incentives 
that the state provides to public organisations can have a significant effect on their behaviour—
much like in the private sector, in which firms operate in a competitive environment, building 
on past research examining the effects of governmental changes in regulation for the public 
healthcare sector (Ketelhöhn and Arévalo, 2016). Prospective NHS FTs were asked to use 
historical data for the past two years as inputs in determining projections for the financial model 
produced as part of their application for FT status (Monitor, 2005). Naturally, positive 
projections of future operating performance are bolstered by strong financial performance in 
the recent past, even outside of such a strict framework. Thus, our evidence calls for improved 
incentive design by regulators. Such systems could, for example, ask for a longer time series of 
data to be used as inputs for relevant model production. This could prevent the structuring of 
the Trusts’ reporting behaviour around a specific incentive, or it could bring about the 
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Table 1 Operating and Residual Surplus/Deficit for NHS Foundation Trusts before/after 
achieving Foundation Trust (FT) status, and Trusts which never achieved this status 
(NonFTs) 
Operating Income Residual Income 
3y before becoming FT N % 3y before becoming FT N % 
Deficit 1 0.76 Deficit 9 7.32 
Surplus 131 99.24 Surplus 114 92.68 
Total 132 100 Total 123 100 
2y before becoming FT N % 2y before becoming FT N % 
Deficit 3 2.17 Deficit 9 6.92 
Surplus 135 97.83 Surplus 121 93.08 
Total 138 100 Total 130 100 
            
1y after becoming FT N % 1y after becoming FT N % 
Deficit 17 12.32 Deficit 37 26.81 
Surplus 121 87.68 Surplus 101 73.19 
Total 138 100 Total 138 100 
2y after becoming FT N % 2y after becoming FT N % 
Deficit 19 13.87 Deficit 34 24.82 
Surplus 118 86.13 Surplus 103 75.18 
Total 137 100 Total 137 100 
3y after becoming FT N % 3y after becoming FT N % 
Deficit 21 16.28 Deficit 32 24.81 
Surplus 108 83.72 Surplus 97 75.19 
Total 129 100 Total 129 100 
 Trusts which never became FTs - NonFTs (2002-2014) 
 N %  N % 
Deficit 265 20.54 Deficit 469 37.64 
Surplus 1,025 79.46 Surplus 777 62.36 




Table 2 Detailed descriptive statistics for levels of surplus/deficit for NHS Foundation Trusts (FTs) before/after FT status conversion 
 Measure: OI/TAt-1 Measure: RI/TAt-1 
Percentile Minus 3 years Minus 2 years Plus 1 year Plus 2 years Plus 3 years Minus 3 years Minus 2 years Plus 1 year Plus 2 years Plus 3 years 
1% 0.0001 -0.0566 -0.3036 -0.1881 -0.2079 -0.0255 -0.0849 -0.3297 -0.2137 -0.2444 
5% 0.0159 0.0139 -0.0406 -0.0335 -0.0852 -0.0092 -0.0115 -0.0669 -0.0604 -0.1219 
10% 0.0218 0.0225 -0.0168 -0.0102 -0.0546 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0454 -0.0363 -0.0893 
25% 0.0279 0.0284 0.0226 0.0219 0.0230 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0034 0.0000 0.0010 
           
50% 0.0333 0.0347 0.0370 0.0364 0.0385 0.0006 0.0008 0.0137 0.0103 0.0134 
           
75% 0.0445 0.0496 0.0532 0.0539 0.0522 0.0076 0.0114 0.0296 0.0291 0.0305 
90% 0.0523 0.0571 0.0722 0.0768 0.0821 0.0162 0.0259 0.0431 0.0485 0.0627 
95% 0.0570 0.0887 0.0885 0.0971 0.0937 0.0197 0.0496 0.0549 0.0817 0.0712 
99% 0.0790 0.1224 0.1380 0.1108 0.1778 0.0515 0.0789 0.0937 0.0933 0.1620 
           




Table 3 Descriptive statistics for NHS Foundation Trusts (FTs) and Trusts which never achieved FT status (NonFTs) 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for FTs  2y before achieving FT status  
  N Q1 Mean  Median  Q3 StDev Skewness Kurtosis 
Cash 140 242 1,780 *** 427 *** 832 4973.1700 6.2286 48.3634 
Current assets (CA) 140 7,667 18,545 ** 12,789 *** 20,048 22309.9500 4.4875 29.1249 
CA including LT debtors 140 7,723 18,655 ** 12,789 *** 20,100 22446.3000 4.4249 28.4185 
Depreciation 140 2,613 5,497 *** 4,382 * 6,801 4388.2300 2.2734 9.4563 
Intangible assets 87 67 477 *** 193 *** 457 1068.1320 5.2750 32.4417 
PP&E 140 67,625 121,026 *** 102,381   152,895 81725.5800 1.7951 8.0366 
Total net assets 140 65,171 120,304  100,516   153,799 82222.3100 1.7023 7.4204 
Total assets 140 75,512 140,065 *** 114,590   177,116 95166.1500 1.7119 6.9784 
CFO 140 4,672 10,024  8,344 * 12,634 8475.9960 2.2552 9.3892 
Total income 140 100,557 165,698 *** 137,790 ** 202,120 104003.6000 1.6814 6.1385 
Income from core activities 140 89,366 144,569 *** 125,205 *** 184,866 85829.5400 1.4853 5.6423 
Total expenditure 140 96,907 161,043 *** 134,902 ** 194,121 101088.5000 1.6815 6.1590 
OI (Operating income-surplus/deficit) 140 2,187 4,819 *** 4,152 *** 6,330 4376.9020 1.4083 7.8790 
RI (Residual income -surplus/deficit) 132 11 771 *** 78 *** 1,055 2907.4230 0.8825 14.6301 
ΔWC/TAt-1 (with LT debtors) 138 -0.0625 -0.0444 *** -0.0443 *** -0.0219 0.0416 -1.0937 9.2694 
ΔWC/TAt-1 (without LT debtors) 138 -0.0640 -0.0450 *** -0.0443 *** -0.0219 0.0425 -1.1618 9.3095 
OI/TAt-1 138 0.0284 0.0385 *** 0.0347 *** 0.0496 0.0244 -0.1650 10.6369 
RI/TAt-1 130 0.0001 0.0063 *** 0.0008   0.0114 0.0227 -0.0757 13.2545 
OI/Staff costs 140 0.0304 0.0457 *** 0.0423 *** 0.0607 0.0286 -0.3704 7.7173 
RI/Staff costs 132 0.0002 0.0073 *** 0.0011 *** 0.0128 0.0241 -0.5362 10.9056 
Net assets/TA 140 0.8353 0.8549 *** 0.8714 *** 0.8993 0.0678 -1.9175 7.9196 
Staff costs/TAt-1 138 0.7084 0.9174 *** 0.8685   1.0460 0.3216 2.1021 10.2626 
Intangible assets/TAt-1 85 0.0010 0.0038 *** 0.0022 *** 0.0038 0.0062 4.5152 28.1480 
PP&E/TAt-1 138 0.8916 0.9766 *** 0.9750 *** 1.0249 0.2127 3.5215 25.0182 
CFO/TAt-1 138 0.0564 0.0829 *** 0.0767 *** 0.1052 0.0398 0.8864 4.6381 
Δ(Total income)/TAt-1 138 0.0625 0.1152   0.0985 *** 0.1455 0.1724 8.1985 85.6968 
Δ(Core income)/TAt-1 138 0.0508 0.0970   0.0842 ** 0.1223 0.1525 7.8476 81.7957 
25 
 
Δ(Total expenditure)/TAt-1 138 0.0532 0.1104   0.0946 ** 0.1384 0.1676 8.0831 83.8983 
Note: Variable definitions are reported in Section 3 and 4.1 of the text.*, **, and *** indicates statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for comparison sample consisting of Trusts (NonFTs) which never achieved FT status (during 2003-2014) 
 N Q1 Mean Median Q3 StDev Skewness Kurtosis 
Cash 1,348 288 4,952 946 5,784 9519.3410 4.0006 23.9440 
Current assets (CA) 1,352 8,493 22,755 16,674 27,881 23849.2000 3.4798 21.8348 
CA including LT debtors 1,352 8,586 23,461 17,120 28,660 24484.0300 3.3314 20.2662 
Depreciation 1,347 2,377 7,088 5,098 9,469 6712.5100 2.0605 8.8620 
Intangible assets 944 114 1,021 409 1,186 1881.9110 5.4634 45.8817 
PP&E 1,347 54,605 144,851 111,607 202,883 129367.9000 2.0565 10.8164 
Total net assets 1,352 48,335 122,250 94,587 172,903 103961.2000 1.6459 7.2511 
Total assets 1,352 66,654 168,622 128,240 233,955 147716.5000 2.1417 11.4486 
CFO 1,356 2,406 9,464 6,891 14,152 13823.4800 0.9476 10.4139 
Total income 1,356 93,730 209,234 166,167 271,251 168611.1000 2.0268 9.0513 
Income from core activities 1,356 82,796 184,624 152,235 238,227 140437.3000 1.7534 7.5182 
Total expenditure 1,356 92,559 207,639 164,220 267,949 169528.6000 2.0919 9.5478 
OI (Operating income-surplus/deficit) 1,356 486 1,693 2,482 6,411 14461.5500 -7.0306 93.0843 
RI (Residual income -surplus/deficit) 1,308 -2,515 -3,776 29 1,015 17468.0800 -8.2678 109.1345 
ΔWC/TAt-1 (with LT debtors) 1,283 -0.0855 -0.0601 -0.0520 -0.0257 0.1119 -2.4053 41.1344 
ΔWC/TAt-1 (without LT debtors) 1,283 -0.0856 -0.0612 -0.0517 -0.0257 0.1133 -2.3705 39.3528 
OI/TAt-1 1,290 0.0102 0.0164 0.0305 0.0440 0.0810 -7.3089 87.2995 
RI/TAt-1 1,246 -0.0210 -0.0173 0.0003 0.0085 0.0933 -6.3391 62.4565 
OI/Staff costs 1,356 0.0095 0.0191 0.0318 0.0503 0.0730 -4.0176 32.3446 
RI/Staff costs 1,308 -0.0248 -0.0238 0.0004 0.0101 0.1305 -15.2672 333.5026 
Net assets/TA 1,352 0.7044 0.7431 0.8133 0.8716 0.2035 -2.1736 9.2288 
Staff costs/TAt-1 1,290 0.7213 1.1059 0.8622 1.1154 1.0566 5.8364 47.2779 
Intangible assets/TAt-1 902 0.0012 0.0083 0.0035 0.0083 0.0242 12.9968 208.7218 
PP&E/TAt-1 1,284 0.8172 0.9165 0.9100 0.9953 0.3475 7.9215 129.5414 
CFO/TAt-1 1,290 0.0390 0.0715 0.0675 0.1000 0.0944 -0.0475 41.7645 
26 
 
Δ(Total income)/TAt-1 1,290 0.0292 0.0990 0.0733 0.1296 0.3011 9.3868 196.2422 
Δ(Core income)/TAt-1 1,290 0.0257 0.0903 0.0678 0.1190 0.2908 9.5266 201.3858 




Table 4 Earnings management by NHS Foundation Trusts (FTs) before achieving FT status vs. Trusts which never achieved FT status (NonFTs) 
Panel A: Pearson correlation coefficient between discretionary accruals (DA) - Nondiscretionary income (NondiscrInc) 
 NHS FTs 
 
Comparison sample- NonFTs  Comparison of correlation coefficients between 
FTs/NonFTs 
     Correlation coef. N   Correlation coef. N Fisher r-to-z transformation -  Z-stat 
2y before becoming FT -0.8251 130 -0.5247 1,052  -6.28 ***  
3y before becoming FT -0.9679 123 -0.5484 1,162  -15.04 ***  
 
Panel B: Test for the statistical significance of mean/median DA for NHS FTs before achieving FT status 
Mean DA N Mean StError t-stat. Pr(|T|>|t|)  Pr(T>t)  
2y before becoming FT 138 0.0067 0.0033 1.9908 0.0485 ** 0.0242 ** 
3y before becoming FT 132 0.0098 0.0039 2.4884 0.0141 ** 0.0070 *** 
Median DA N Median Z-stat. Prob>|z|      
2y before becoming FT 138 0.0053 1.9780 0.0480 ***      
3y before becoming FT 132 0.0095 2.6010 0.0093 **      
 
Panel C: Tests for differences in means/medians for DA between FTs-NonFTs 
  Means   N Mean StError t-stat. Pr(|T|>|t|)  Pr(T < t)  
2y before becoming FT NonFTs 1,088 -0.0016 0.0023      
  FTs 138 0.0067 0.0033      
  Difference  -0.0083 0.0041 -2.0388 0.0424 ** 0.0212 ** 
3y before becoming FT NonFTs 1,216 -0.0008 0.0021      
  FTs 132 0.0098 0.0039      
  Difference  -0.0106 0.0045 -2.3793 0.0182 ** 0.0091 *** 
  Medians   N Z-stat. Prob>|z|      
2y before becoming FT NonFTs 1,088        
  FTs 138 -1.3720 0.1700      
3y before becoming FT NonFTs 1,216        
  FTs 132 -1.6670 0.0955 *     
Note: DA are estimated as described in Section 3.1. *, **, and *** indicates statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 5 Testing for EM by performing propensity score matching between FTs before achieving FT status 
vs. NonFTs 
2y before becoming FT 
Probit model estimation Coef. StError Z-stat   
c 0.1383 0.6893 0.20   
LnTA -0.0999 0.0549 -1.82 *  
Staff costs/TAt-1 -0.2756 0.1107 -2.49 **  
N 1,424     
X2 10.54 ***    
Log likelihood -447.903     
Pseudo R2 0.0116     
Mean DA comparison     
 Treated Control % bias t-test  
DA 0.0067 -0.0036 16.90 1.84 * 
 
3y before becoming FT 
Probit model estimation Coef St Er Z-stat.     
c 0.0489 0.6505 0.08     
LnTA -0.1024 0.0521 -1.97 **   
Staff costs/TAt-1 -0.2620 0.1110 -2.36 *   
N 1,607       
X2 9.72 ***      
Log likelihood -451.475         
Pseudo R2 0.0106         
Mean DA comparison        
 Treated Control % bias t-test  
DA 0.0098 -0.0084 29.8 3.04 *** 
Note: The propensity score matching procedure and variable definitions are described in Section 4.2. **, and *** indicates statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
 Table 6 Regression estimations on the zero profit hypothesis - comparison between NHS Foundation 
Trusts (FTs) before achieving FT status and Trusts which never achieved FT status (NonFTs) 
FTs NonFTs - Comparison sample 
 2y before becoming FT Coef. t-stat.   Coef. t-stat. . 
c 0.0041 1.98 ** c -0.0099 -5.42 *** 
NondiscrInc -0.8567 -7.68 *** NondiscrInc -0.5130 -3.77 *** 
Lagged RI/TAt-1   0.5657 2.18  ** Lagged RI/TAt-1   0.0625 1.15  
Lagged DA  0.0038 0.07   Lagged DA  -0.0151 -0.34   
F-stat. 24.19 ***   F-stat. 5.77 ***   
R-Squared 0.7039     R-Squared 0.298     
N 121     N 960     
VIF NondiscrInc 1.04     VIF NondiscrInc 1.02     
3y before becoming FT Coef. t-stat.   Coef. t-stat.  
c 0.0040 3.59 *** c -0.0089 -5.37 *** 
NondiscrInc -0.9968 -23.50 *** NondiscrInc -0.5412 -4.18 *** 
Lagged RI/TAt-1   0.1165 1.52   Lagged RI/TAt-1   0.0728 1.43   
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Lagged DA - -0.0246 -0.85   Lagged DA  -0.0197 -0.52   
F-stat.  207.84 ***   F-stat. 6.68 ***   
R-Squared 0.9400     R-Squared 0.2570     
N 110     N 1,057     
VIF NondiscrInc 1.03     VIF NondiscrInc 1.02     
Coefficient comparison tests for NondiscrInc between FTs and NonFTs regressions 
2y before becoming FT 
X2stat 3.88 **           
3y  before becoming FT 
X2stat 11.24 ***           




Table 7 The impact of potential earnings management by NHS Foundation Trusts (FTs) before achieving FT 
status on their subsequent operating performance 
Panel A: Dependent variable = binary variable equal to one if RI or OI is positive one year post-FT status, and 
zero otherwise 
 Residual income (RI) Operating Income (OI) 
  Coef. Z-stat  Coef. Z-stat  
c 14.5599 1.61   21.8680 2.10 ** 
DA -15.9687 -1.96 ** -17.9043 -1.72 * 
OI/TAt-1 17.9989 2.47 ** -0.6305 -0.07   
LnTA -0.3306 -0.69   -1.1787 -2.12 ** 
Δ(Core income)/TAt-1 10.0847 2.01 ** 14.3884 2.14 ** 
Δ(Total expenditure)/TAt-1 -6.1756 -1.31   -12.7764 -2.09 ** 
Net assets/TA -9.6858 -1.72 * -5.8756 -0.84   
ΔWC/TAt-1  16.3550 2.13 ** 13.3779 1.19   
Staff costs/TAt-1 -1.4647 -1.24   -0.1649 -0.10   
Intangible assets/TAt-1 26.4727 0.35   134.7281 1.26   
Wald statistic 16.17 *   12.74     
Pseudo R2 0.1198     0.1129     
Pseudo likelihood -66.8042     -41.6685     
N 134     134     
VIF DA 1.57     1.57     
Panel B: Dependent variable = the level of RI or OI (scaled by lagged TA) one year post-FT status  
 Residual income (RI) Operating Income (OI) 
  Coef. t--stat  Coef. t--stat  
c 0.3427 1.87 * 0.3643 2.04 ** 
DA -0.1984 -1.94 * -0.1441 -1.34   
OI/TAt-1 0.2317 1.73 * 0.2102 1.43   
LnTA -0.0224 -1.56   -0.0162 -1.17   
Δ(Core income)/TAt-1 0.1795 1.93 * 0.0124 0.08   
Δ(Total expenditure/)TAt-1 -0.1291 -1.70 * 0.0020 0.02   
Net assets/TA -0.0707 -1.07   -0.1615 -1.57   
ΔWC/TAt-1  0.2243 1.51   0.3042 1.93 * 
Staff costs/TAt-1 -0.0177 -1.14   0.0030 0.15   
30 
 
Intangible assets/TAt-1 0.0900 0.10   -0.7085 -0.79   
F-stat 2.40 **   1.81 *   
R2 0.1134     0.1217     
N 134     134     
VIF DA 1.64     1.64     
Note: Variable definitions are described in Sections 3.1 and 4.3. *, **, and *** indicates statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. 
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